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ABSTRACT
In 1980s, neuroscientists joined philosophers and psychologists in the investigation of voli-
tional actions and freedom of will. In a series of experiments pioneered by Benjamin Libet 
(1985), it was observed that some neural activities correlated with volitional action regularly 
precedes the conscious will to perform it, which suggests that what appears to be a free 
action may actually be predetermined by some neural activities, even before the conscious 
intention to act arises.  Shortly after publication of that study, Libet’s findings and interpre-
tations were started to be criticized on philosophical and methodological grounds. In this 
study, the legitimacy of the criticisms directed to Libet’s and his successors’ experiments is 
discussed by taking recent neuroscience studies on volition into account and it is argued 
that these criticisms are not sufficient to eliminate the doubt that these experiments casted 
on the freedom of the will.
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RESUMO
Na década de 1980, os neurocientistas uniram-se a filósofos e psicólogos na investigação 
das ações volitivas e da liberdade da vontade. Em uma série de experimentos liderados por 
Benjamin Libet (1985), foi observado que algumas atividades neurais correlacionadas com 
a ação volitiva regularmente precedem a vontade consciente de realizá-la, o que sugere 
que o que parece ser uma ação livre pode, na verdade, ser predeterminado por algumas 
atividades neurais, mesmo antes de surgir a intenção consciente de agir. Logo após a publi-
cação desse estudo, as descobertas e interpretações de Libet começaram a ser criticadas 
em bases filosóficas e metodológicas. Neste estudo, discute-se a legitimidade das críticas 
dirigidas aos experimentos de Libet e seus sucessores, levando-se em conta estudos recen-
tes da neurociência sobre a volição e argumenta-se que essas críticas não são suficientes 
para eliminar a dúvida que esses experimentos lançaram sobre a liberdade da vontade. 
Palavras-chave: Livre-arbítrio, Benjamin Libet, neurociência, intenções inconscientes.
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Introduction
Choosing from among the possible options available to 
an individual is one of the most indisp ensable human abili-
ties. Individuals tend to assume that these choices are free, at 
least when they do not investigate the question from a philo-
sophical or scientific persp ective. From this point of view, we 
influence our future, at the very moment we make a delib-
erate decision.2 On the other hand, some philosophical and 
scientific studies threaten this intuitive belief that our choices 
are free. Determinism is perceived as a threat to freedom of 
will by incompatibilist thinkers. For an incompatibilist, if our 
decisions are determined before we make them, it cannot be 
true that we have genuine alternatives and it cannot be true 
that we make this decision freely (Van Inwagen, 1978; Ginet, 
1996; Kane, 1999). 
Benjamin Libet’s (1985) seminal work poses a challenge 
related to determination and causal efficacy of conscious will.
Libet’s work was based on an experiment in which partici-
pants were asked to flex their finger or wrist whenever they 
want to do so. Meanwhile, using a rotating clock dial the par-
ticipants noted when they first had the intention to flex, the 
timing of the actual flex was recoded. Simultaneously, Libet 
measured the readiness potential (RP)—an electrophysio-
logical event in the supplementary motor area (SMA)—and 
observed that the RP regularly preceded the participants’ 
awareness of their intention to flex by 200 ms. These findings 
indicate that there was a physical indication in the brain that 
the participants would flex their finger even before they were 
consciously aware of their intention to do so. By challenging 
the dominant intuition that conscious will is driving power of 
volitional act ions, Libet’s work was considered ground-break-
ing and remains an important reference point. If we consider 
Libet’s research method sound, then it could be concluded 
that intention is nothing more than the mediator between 
unconscious neurobiological act ivity (the cause of any act ion) 
and resulting act ion. It is even possible that conscious inten-
tion is only an epiphenomenon, lacking any causal power. On 
the other hand, acceptance of Libet’s findings is not universal; 
his research methods and his interpretations of the results 
have been widely criticized. 
The present study aims to provide an overview of the 
current philosophical and scientific literature related to the 
Libet’s work on free will, in an effort to show that Libet’s find-
ings present an important obstacle to the libertarians (in the 
context of metaphysical freedom), who defend that there are 
genuine alternative possibilities available to people when they 
make a decision. In each of the following sections a particu-
lar objection to relevance of Libet’s experiment to free will is 
presented and discussed, which, in total, will illustrate that 
the experiment substantially strengthens the view that we do 
not exercise free will, since we may not really be choosing our 
act ions among from genuine alternative possible act ions.
1. Concerns on Measurement 
and Interpretation of the Gap 
Between RP and Conscious Will 
 Before stepping into conceptual discussions on free 
will, in this section, some remarks about the concerns on the 
amount and interpretation of the time gap between RP and 
conscious will, will be made. Such criticisms of Libet center 
on the fact that given a number of variables involved in his 
experiment the 200-ms gap between RP and awareness of 
will might in fact be insignificant (Libet, 1985, p. 539). Such 
criticism address mainly two possible alternative explanations 
for 200-ms gap: (1) The amount of time the participants 
needed to be aware of their will; (2) the amount of time the 
participants needed to read the clock.3 Moreover, Daniel. 
C. Dennett (1991; 2004) and Filippo Tempia (2008) argue 
that Libet’s very interesting finding may be a result of inac-
curate perception of the participants about the order of in-
ternal events esp ecially when very short periods of time are 
concerned.4 These methodological problems become less of a 
concern over time; since (1) several subsequent experiments 
dramatically extended the measured time gap between phys-
ical markers (such as RP) and conscious awareness of will 
from the 200 ms noted by Libet to as much as 7-10 seconds 
(Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & 
Haynes, 2008)5  and (2) several other experiments support 
the hypothesis that there are causal relationships between 
neural states preceding conscious will and conscious will itself 
(Brasil-Neto, Pascual-Leone, Valls-Solé , Cohen , & Hallett, 
1992; Fried, et al., 1991; Desmurget, et al., 2009; Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999).6
 2. What Counts as Free Action?
Considering the complexity of human behavior, Libet’s 
decision to base his experiment on the simple and easy to 
observe/measure behavior of finger/wrist flexion is meth-
odologically wise; however, the very same decision is also a 
primary reason why Libet’s work remains underappreciat-
ed. Critics of his work, esp ecially philosophers, question the 
2 For a discussion on the subjective experience of free will and its implications on the problem of free will, see Arıkan Sandıkçıoglu, 2016.
3 See Wasserman, 1985.
4 See also Bayne, 2011 and Dominika, et al., 2018.
5 See also Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013.
6 Sohn, Kaelin-Lang and Hallett (2003) were unable to reproduce the results of Brasil-Neto, Pascual-Leone, Valls-Solé, Cohen , & Hallett, 1992.
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pertinence of the act ion measured by Libet to infer daring 
conclusions on free will. John Searle states that, “(…) the ex-
amples used in the study of the readiness potential tend to 
be rather trivial examples of human behavior” (Searle, 2010, 
p. 125). Searle suggests that a more appropriate (less trivial) 
behavior/act ion for investigation would be (if it were possible 
to investigate) Churchill’s decision in 1940 to continue fight-
ing the Germans. Alfred R. Mele (2009, p. 83) contends that 
the “trivial” act ions measured in readiness potential studies 
are similar to Buridan scenarios in which participants must 
choose between two equally attract ive alternatives. Bruno G. 
Breitmeyer similarly does not consider finger/wrist flexion a 
“meaningful act ion,” given its low cost/benefit function (Li-
bet, 1985, p. 539). He considers the act ion that Libet studied 
to be habitual, in William James’ sense (1950). Searle, Mele 
and Breitmeyer thusly fundamentally question Libet’s philo-
sophical interpretation of his findings based on the claim that 
the assigned task does not qualify as a valid or at least inter-
esting example of an expression of free will, since finger/wrist 
flexion does not bring about important differences, under 
given circumstances.
It is true that in the setting of Libet’s experiment, finger/
wrist flexion was devoid of any major ethical or pragmatic val-
ue, and a less controversial version of the experiment would 
involve a more significant value for the subjects.  In the next 
section, I will suggest a version of Libet’s experiment which 
clearly involves more significant ethical and/or pragmatic val-
ue(s), without causing any extra complications affecting the 
experiment’s feasibility and defend that the debates on the 
ethical/pragmatic significance of studied act ion can experi-
mentally be settled.  
On the other hand, since such an experiment has not 
yet been conducted,7 in this section, the subject will be dis-
cussed conceptually and theoretically. Even if it is true that 
finger/writs flexion in the Libet’s experiment does not in-
volve major values, I defend that the act ions in question are 
associated with some degree of ethical and/or pragmatic values. 
Conscious intentional act ion in the absence of motive is con-
ceptually impossible, as such act ions are performed explicitly 
to achieve a goal, regardless of the degree of its significance. 
One then might question what motivation is there to perform 
finger/wrist flexion and what motivation is there to perform 
it at a particular time in an experimental setting. As John S. 
Stamm and Libet indicate, boredom might have been a mo-
tive for performing finger/wrist flexion at any time during 
the allotted time period (Libet, 1985). It’s also possible that 
Libet’s participants’ motivation for performing finger/wrist 
flexion had to do with meeting their obligation of being a par-
ticipant of the experiment and/or they may have just wanted 
to please the researcher(s). As the participants were deciding 
when to perform the finger/wrist flexion, let’s consider what 
their internal monologue might have been: “Do I really want 
to flex now?”; “If I wait a little longer will I have a stronger 
desire to flex?”; “Am I waiting too long?”; “Should I flex spon-
taneously?”; Should I choose a time to flex in advance?”; “The 
previous time I flexed too early, maybe I will flex later this 
time”. These are just a few examples of the possible thoughts’ 
participants might have had in association with Libet’s exper-
imental model, and they imply that despite the conclusions 
of Libet’s critics, a simple finger/wrist flexion, in fact, may in-
volve some degree of ethical and/or pragmatic value.8
 Another weakness of standard Libet-style experiments 
is about the number of repetitions the participants need to do. 
In order to gather enough neural data, participants need to do 
the same task many times and this might be causing them to 
start making decisions automatically without being mentally 
and emotionally involved in the task. So even if the act ions 
being studied involve a degree of ethical and/or pragmatic val-
ue, this value induces less and less mental/emotional response 
from the participants, after doing excessive repetitions. This is 
a fair concern and I believe that the experimental paradigm 
that I will present in the next section will not be suffering 
from this concern as much as most current studies do. On the 
other hand, even if I agree that the small amount of ethical/
pragmatic value(s) involved in Libet-style experiments would 
induce even smaller mental/emotional involvement after 
many repetitions; for the reasons mentioned above, I defend 
that there should be a degree of mental/emotional involve-
ment. Boredom and responsibility to complete the task could 
become the main motives after many repetitions; however, 
these motives too are related to ethical/pragmatic values.
 Important or trivial all decisions share a few charact er-
istics: They are conscious and they are made in an effort to 
reach an important or unimportant goal throughout a prob-
abilistic or deterministic interact ion with the environment. 
Lower-order, less significant decisions are not qualitatively 
different from higher-order, more substantial decisions, in 
that resp ect. No matter how relatively significant or insig-
nificant it may be, it is conceptually necessary that they in-
volve some subjective pragmatic/ethical value; otherwise, we 
would have no reason to choose.
Bridgeman raises another criticism to Libet: For Bridge-
man act ions of the participants in the experiment were not a 
consequence of free choice, since the participants were told by 
7 In the last few years, abstract choices of human beings and pragmatic choices of monkeys are started to be investigated, in addition 
to the motor actions (Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013; Maoz, et al., 2013). The results show that unconscious brain activity regularly 
precedes higher-level abstract decisions of this sort too. 
8 Libet and colleagues (1983, p. 625) instructed participants of the experiment “(…) to let the urge to act appear on its own at any time 
without any preplanning or concentration on when to act”. This may seem to some readers to be a reason why the participants would 
not have some of the monologues. On the other hand, I believe, you cannot eliminate all these thoughts by instructing participants. 
Flexing your finger at a particular moment rather than other moments without any reason, seems quite unlikely. For a discussion on the 
question whether the actions studied in Libet-style experiments fall within the scope of free will, see Bayne, 2011.
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the experimenter to act within certain boundaries (Libet, 1985, 
p. 540). Obviously, there are certain restrictions under which the 
participants made their choices; however, Bridgeman’s point is 
not quite as simple as it appears, because no matter what inten-
tional act ion is considered, an individual must necessarily act un-
der some limitations (i.e. social norms, abilities, laws of physics). 
Therefore, an act ion’s being performed under certain limitations, 
does not show that it is not a pertinent act ion to investigate free 
choices. In Libet’s case of deciding when to perform finger/wrist 
flexion, the participants were limited by the experimental pro-
tocol while they were also had alternatives to select the time to 
flex. Searle’s example of Churchill’s decision to continue fighting 
the Germans, which Bridgeman himself would consider to be a 
legitimate instance of a free decision, was also subjected to limita-
tions—economic, military, and political. Every decision is associ-
ated with some limiting factors that may or may not be a result 
of the individual’s earlier decisions, but despite the fact that such 
factors limit the number of alternative act ions, they do not deter-
mine choice per se. That is precisely why we refer to this act ivity 
as deciding; conceptually sp eaking, decisions require not infinite, 
but at least two possible alternatives. Since Libet’s participants did 
have numerous alternatives for the timing of finger/wrist flexion, 
I insist that the experiments are relevant to free will in a philo-
sophical sense. If deciding when to perform finger/wrist flexion 
and continuing to fight the Germans during WWII are claimed 
to be substantially different types of decisions, then a clear quali-
tative difference must be shown.
Last but not least, Libet’s participants believed that they 
chose their act ion freely; “Subjects reported that they were 
aware of the urge or intention to move before every act in the 
series; that is, the acts were not automatic or involuntary ‘tics’” 
(Libet, 1985, p. 532). Even if used only to challenge the par-
ticipants’ belief that they chose to perform the act ion freely, 
Libet’s finding is extremely interesting and remains relevant 
to the question of free will.9
3. A Methodological Suggestion 
to Study Ethically/Pragmatically 
More Significant Actions
 In line with the critics discussed in the previous section, 
Libet has pointed some difficulties associated with studying 
free will experimentally: 
There are several concerns about the signifi-
cance of the act we studied, a spontaneous-
ly initiated quick flexion of fingers or wrist, 
in relation to voluntary actions in general 
(Breitmeyer, Bridgeman, Danto, Jung, Lat-
to). We wanted our measurements of rela-
tive timings (for the onsets of RP and W) to 
be quantitative and operationally definable, 
without reliance on intuitive impressions 
or speculations. Such an objective is much 
more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve 
with any of the more common voluntary ac-
tions recommended by the commentators 
for study  (Libet, 1985, p. 562).
Libet may seem right in that it is difficult to conduct an 
experiment in which ethically and pragmatically more signif-
icant act ions are observed; however, this drawback of Libet’s 
experimental model, in my opinion, can be avoided.  While 
it is common for psychologists and economists to study ethi-
cal and pragmatic human behavior using prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) scenarios, to the best of my knowledge, PD scenarios 
have not been used in experiments studying free will, up to 
the date. 
PD scenarios are simple game theoretic situations in-
volving two individuals making ethically/pragmatically sig-
nificant decisions. An example payoff matrix could be as 
shown in the Table.
In this PD scenario, two participants are trying to earn 
some money in an interact ive game. Each participant choos-
es their act ion not knowing what the other will do. If both 
of the participants choose to cooperate by pressing button 1, 
they each get $10. If (only) one of the participants betrays the 
other by pressing button 2, the defector receives $15, whereas 
the other gets nothing. Finally, if both participants choose to 
defect, they each get $5. As the only Nash equilibrium of this 
payoff matrix (mutual defection) is not pareto optimal, playing 
an iterative version of this game optimally (with resp ect to total 
payoff) requires coordination and trust between two parties. 
The interesting asp ect of PD can also be formulated as follows: 
While no matter what other player chooses, betrayal of each 
opponent is more profitable for themselves; mutual betrayal is 
not as profitable as mutual cooperation. Noting that there are 
Libet-style experiments that provide participants the freedom 
to choose between two possible act ions (Sohn, Kaelin-Lang, & 
Hallett, 2003; Haggard & Eimer, 1999), PD scenarios can be 
9 See also Libet, 2003 and Bayne, 2011.
Participant 1/Participant 2 Button 1 (Cooperation) Button 2 (Defection)
Button 1 (Cooperation) $10, $10 $0, $15
Button 2 (Defection) $15, $0 $5, $5
Table. Payoff matrix for PD scenario.
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used in the future studies. By associating the choice between 
cooperation and defection (or betrayal) to two buttons, study-
ing ethically/pragmatically more significant act ions would be 
as easy as studying a finger flexion. 
Another advantage of this experimental paradigm is that 
it is more likely to keep the participant’s mental/emotional in-
volvement in the task stronger after many repetitions. If ethi-
cal/pragmatic asp ect of a PD scenario is presented to the par-
ticipants, rewards and payoff matrix involved in the PD game 
are adjusted throughout iterative games properly, this may in-
duce the participants to get involved more in their decisions.10
Such an experiment would test the hypothesis that de-
cisions with a significant ethical and/or pragmatic value is 
predictable by neural act ivity preceding the conscious will. 
These experiments would not only contribute to the neuro-
science of free will, but also have the potential to answer some 
questions, contribute to existing debates and give rise to new 
questions in the field of philosophy of freedom.
 4. Causal Relationships Implied 
by Libet’s Experiment
 Libet’s or his successor’s studies do not show that RP or 
any other unconscious neural act ivity determines conscious 
will, since the relationships found in these studies are not de-
terministic. They only suggest that there are significant cor-
relations between unconscious neural act ivities and conscious 
will (Fischborn, 2016). However, considering the computa-
tional complexity of the brain, it is not surprising at all that 
relationships found in these studies are not deterministic or 
do not imply neurological determinism. After all, there are 
approximately 100 billion neurons in a human brain and our 
brain imaging methods are quite limited with resp ect to spa-
tial and temporal resolution (Herculano-Houzel, 2009; Me-
non, Gati, Goodyear, Luknowsky, & Thomas, 1998; Kim, Ri-
cher, & Uğurbil, 1997).  Perhaps, neuroscience will not reveal 
causal relationships between unconscious neural act ivities 
and conscious will precisely, without methodological revolu-
tions. However, significant correlations found in such a com-
plex system (nervous system), with limited measurement and 
computational tools, in my opinion, shades doubt on the idea 
that conscious will is at least partly independent contributor 
of volitional act ions.
Although there are supporting findings (Fried, Mu-
kamel, & Kreiman, 2011), Libet’s experiment does not un-
equivocally show that the RP is a cause of conscious inten-
tion. Mele, (2009), Robert W. Doty (Libet, 1985, p. 542), Tim 
Bayne (2011), Hans Radder and Gerben Meynen (2012)  ar-
gue that probably RP is not a cause of conscious intention.11
Radder and Meynen give important philosophical insight 
why data collected in Libet-style experiments does not show 
that RP is a cause of free decisions and act ions; however, there 
are a few points to discuss in their claims: 
Even if we could establish a strong correla-
tion between individual RPs and Ws, this 
fact alone would not be enough for drawing 
the relevant conclusions. After all, the sing-
ing of early birds (who start before sunrise) 
is strongly correlated with, but definitely 
does not initiate, the rising of the sun (Rad-
der & Meynen, 2012, p. 12).
It is definitely true that singing of early birds does not 
initiate the rising of the sun; however, it is highly likely that 
two events have causal relationships, since there is a consis-
tent and non-accidental correlation. Actually, there is a re-
lationship between early singing behavior of birds and the 
amount of light they perceive from the environment (Mont-
gomerie & Doucet, 2007, pp. 183-184). Needless to say, the 
very same event, namely relative movement of the Earth and 
the Sun causes both increases in the amount of light the birds 
perceive and sunrise. That is to say this relative movement is 
the common cause of both early singing behavior of birds and 
rising of the Sun. 
 In the same way, in my opinion, the correlation between 
RP and conscious intention suggests that they are causally 
linked in a way that has yet to be discerned. In other words, 
RP may not be a cause or the cause of conscious will as Alex-
ander and colleagues (2015) defend; but it is likely that RP is 
causally related to conscious will in one way or another: To 
illustrate, RP and conscious intention might have a common 
cause, or RP might be a mediatory cause which only partly 
contributes to conscious will. Regardless of how one thinks 
about the link between RP and conscious intention, Libet’s 
and his successors’ findings suggest that there is a significant 
causal link between the two events.12 This likelihood threat-
ens the idea that when we consciously intend to do something, 
we act ively influence on the future course of our act ions. 
Libet (1985), Haggard (2005), Roediger et al. (2008), 
and Shariff et al. (2008) think that if there is a neural event 
(N) regularly preceding an act ion (A) and associated con-
scious will (W), then W cannot be the cause of A. This notion 
is understandable, as N determines A before W comes into 
existence; however, Mele, states that this reasoning is faulty: 
The point to be noticed here is that from 
the datum that some “neural events lead-
ing up to the movement” begin before 
10 Avoiding some of the experimental restrictions may also be used as a means to avoid automatic responses. For an experimental par-
adigm in which participants decide whether or not to follow the instruction see Salvaris & Haggard, 2014.
11 For another study on the causal status or RP in volitional actions see Keller & Heckhausen, 1990.
12 For a discussion on the causal status of conscious will, see Wegner & Wheater, 1999; Wegner, 2003 and Alexander, et al., 2015.
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a conscious proximal intention emerges, 
one cannot legitimately infer that any of 
the following play no role in producing the 
movement: the acquisition of the proximal 
intention, the agent’s consciousness of the 
intention, or the physical correlates of ei-
ther of these items. After all, when lighting 
a fuse precedes the burning of the fuse, 
which in turn precedes a firecracker explod-
ing, we do not infer that the burning of the 
fuse plays no causal role in producing the 
explosion (Mele, 2009, p. 71). 
Mele is right in that the (neural act ivity underlying) 
conscious will13 may be a mediatory cause of act ion that is 
caused by unconscious neural events; however, even if the 
conscious will is a mediatory cause of performed act ion, this 
does not help the existence of free will in a philosophically 
significant sense. Note that in such a scenario, (assuming that 
future studies would find deterministic relationships between 
conscious will and previous unconscious neural act ivity) con-
scious will, which is determined by unconscious events, de-
termines the act ion, which implies that the unconscious ac-
tion determines the act ion by transitivity. Even if a conscious 
will, which is determined by unconscious events, causes an 
act ion, the act ion determined by unconscious events cannot 
be chosen freely, as we have no control over the unconscious 
neural act ivity determining the will and as a result the act ion. 
Taking conscious will as a mediatory cause which is 
determined by some unconscious event reminds one the 
thought experiments on mind control. Assume that a crazy 
neuroscientist, Jane, remotely controls the neural mechanism 
underlying her husband’s ( John) conscious will by using a 
device she installed into his brain. She cannot make John sit 
down or stand up involuntarily, because her device does not 
let her determine John’s motor act ions directly. What she can 
do, on the other hand, is to make John want to sit down and 
John’s brain does the rest for her. To illustrate, using her device 
she makes John intensely desire to buy a red rose for herself: 
In such a case, John does what he (and Jane) wants, if there is 
no physical reason preventing him from buying a rose. When 
she wants him to walk out of or come back to the house, she 
does not (and cannot) determine John’s motor act ions, but 
modifies his conscious will accordingly. In such cases, John’s 
conscious will (determined by Jane) is a mediatory cause of 
his act ions; but still, it seems unreasonable to claim that his 
act ions are caused by his free will, since his will is determined 
by something over which he has no control. This is the reason 
why if our conscious will is determined by some unconscious 
events over which we have no control, our conscious will’s 
being the cause of our act ions does not help to save freedom. 
5. Possibility of Vetoing the 
Intended Action
 Libet’s (1985; 1999; 2003) studies suggests that there is 
a possibility of vetoing a preplanned act ion as late as milli-
seconds before the act ion is performed, given that individual 
wants to do so. Doty’s (Libet, 1985, p. 542) and Fred Voll-
mer’s (2001) key solution to the problem of freedom lies in 
this possibility. According to this view, the act of conscious ve-
toing is a lifesaver for freedom, which could be considered to 
be in agreement with the libertarian principle of alternative 
possibilities, as, in a way, it embraces the possibility that an 
individual could do otherwise if s/he wants to (Kane, 1999; 
Kane, 1996; Kane, 1989; Ginet, 1996; Van Inwagen, 1983). 
On the other hand, even if there are some limitations with 
their study, Elisa Filevich  , Simone Kühn and Patrick Hag-
gard’s (2013) findings suggest that there are actually neural 
precursors of decisions whether or not to veto a previously 
made decision.14  Ockham’s razor also implies that conscious 
vetoing should be expected to be dependent on physical act iv-
ity rather than being independent of it. If the initial intention 
to move is dependent on physical events, then the subsequent 
intention to veto or confirm the initial intention should also 
be determined by physical events. If this is not the case, two 
separate theories of conscious intention are required to ex-
plain initial intention and later intention to veto. That is to 
say, despite the fact that possibility of vetoing the predeter-
mined act ion independent of prior neural act ivity is logically 
possible, I argue that it is not likely due to its ad hoc nature.15
6. The Unconscious Intention to 
Act
The proposed existence of unconscious intentions is 
another hypothesis that, if proven to be true, may protect 
the free will from implications of Libet’s findings. Arthur 
C. Danto thinks that consciousness is not a necessary con-
dition for freedom (Libet, 1985, p. 541). Mele, defending 
a similar position quoting Anthony Marcel: “Oddly, many 
psychologists seem to assume that intentions are by their 
nature conscious (as cited in Mele, 2009).”16 If Danto, Mele, 
13 This paper does not hold a dualistic view and assumes that every mental state including conscious will, unconscious intentions, and so 
on, supervene upon physical. Therefore, whenever it is stated that a mental state is a cause of an action or event, in this paper, it should 
be understood as the physical events underlying that mental state is the cause of that action or event.
14 The time interval during which an individual is able to veto a previous intention is as short as 100-200 ms, rendering its experimental 
observation  difficult (Schultze-Kraft, et al., 2016; Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012; Libet, 1999; 1985).
15 Haggard (2008; 2005) provides a detailed scientific and philosophical analysis of the thesis that conscious vetoing is a result of physical 
activity in the nervous system.
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and Marcel are correct in that intentions do not need to 
be conscious, then it is possible that an unconscious inten-
tion precedes and causes the RP before the conscious in-
tention to act arises. Note that Danto, Mele, and Marcel’s 
hypothesis that there are unconscious intentions seems to 
be in agreement with Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus’s studies 
on skillful coping (Radman, 2012; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; 
2000). Danto exemplifies allegedly free act ions without 
conscious deliberation between alternatives: “A slow-mo-
tion film of Matisse shows the artist making countless deci-
sions with his fingers that at normal sp eed looks like a single 
confident chalk stroke defining the edge of a leaf ”  (Libet, 
1985, p. 541). Mele, one of the most well-known proponents 
of unconscious intentions, provides another example, which 
seems in agreement with those of Danto and the Dreyfuses: 
When I intentionally unlocked my office 
door this morning, I intended to unlock it. 
But since I am in the habit of unlocking my 
door in the morning and conditions this 
morning were normal, nothing called for a 
decision to unlock it. The requirements for 
deciding are stronger than those for intend-
ing (Mele, 1992, p. 231).
There are certainly unconscious behaviors that serve for 
a purpose. We do not consciously decide how far forward we 
should put our foot in order to stay balanced while walking, 
nor does a playmaker necessarily make a conscious decision 
about the angle she should throw the basketball to deliver 
it to a teammate. On the other hand, contrary to claims of 
these critics of Libet, it is not clear that such habitual uncon-
scious behaviors that serve for a purpose are legitimate ex-
amples of intentional act ion.17 First, it can be defended that 
Mele’s, Danto’s and the Dreyfuses’ conception of unconscious 
intention is self-contradictory, on the premise (which I hold) 
that intention requires deliberation and deliberation requires 
consciousness. Frederick A. Siegler (1967, p. 258) writes “(…) 
a person cannot be unaware of his intention”.18 For this view 
in Mele’s example of allegedly unconscious intention, before 
he unlocked the door he might have well (consciously) decid-
ed (for the reasons he is aware of) to get into his room. If so, 
getting into the room is definitely intentional; but since he did 
not consciously decide to unlock the door, he did not uncon-
sciously intend to unlock the door. Even if Mele does not accept 
the premise that all intentions require deliberation, there is an-
other question he and proponents of unconscious intentions 
need to account for: What is the (introsp ective) evidence that 
such unconscious intentions exist at all? In other words, how 
does one figure out that s/he unconsciously intended to act in 
a certain way? One may well be aware of the outcome act ion 
resulting from the unconscious intention, yet, by definition, 
s/he cannot be aware of the unconscious intention. To put it 
more concretely, why would Mele think that he unconsciously
intended to unlock the door, even if he does not have a mem-
ory of deliberating or deciding to unlock it? Apparently, Mele 
might not have been aware that he intended to open the door 
while he was unconsciously intending to do so. However, at 
some point after unlocking the door, because he was aware 
that he did, in fact, unlock the door, which is not a tic or reflex 
and which serves for a purpose of him, he decides that he must 
have unconsciously intended to perform it. Only evidence that 
supports the idea that the unconscious behavior under consid-
eration is intentional is that it serves for a purpose; however, 
a behavior’s serving for a purpose does not guarantee that it 
is intentional. Intentional act ions and behaviors serving for 
a purpose are not one and the same thing. A person’s heart’s 
beating or a toy robot’s changing direction when it encounters 
an obstacle serves for a purpose; yet, these behaviors are obvi-
ously not intentional. Assuming that deliberation is a neces-
sary condition for intentions, it can be claimed that in Mele’s 
case, the behavior of unlocking the door is not caused by an in-
tention but a tendency: After gaining many experiences about 
locked doors and particularly his office door, perhaps, Mele’s 
nervous system developed an unconscious tendency to unlock 
his door whenever he consciously intends to get into his room. 
After all, unlocking the door is a necessary subtask of the task of 
getting into his office room.
Catherine Raeff (2017) also defends that Libet’s exper-
iment does not show that we are not free, in a similar way 
with Mele:
[F]rom a systems perspective, non-con-
scious aspects of action cannot be isolat-
ed from the wider whole of which they are 
parts, and sometimes, the wider whole of 
which non-conscious aspects of action are 
parts is a form of free action. The non-con-
scious activity does not occur in isolation, 
but takes on meaning within the wider 
whole of free action. As such, it does not 
necessarily mean that the person is not act-
ing freely, but rather that non-conscious 
activity is integrated into free action. For 
example, in some cases, voting involves 
pulling a lever or placing a ballot into a box. 
A person may have deliberated and decid-
ed whom to vote for, and thus he/she is en-
gaging in free action when voting. However, 
pulling the lever or folding the ballot before 
putting it in the ballot box may occur quite 
16 A similar position is advocated in Dreyfus, 2000.
17 For comprehensive discussions on unconscious intentions and skill acquisition see Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2000; 
Dreyfus H. L., Responses, 2000 and Freeman, 2001.
18 Even if they do not directly discuss coherency of unconscious intentions, see Davidson, 2001 and Carrier, 1986; which discuss the 
relationship between intentional actions and subjective reasons to act in a certain way. See also Bayne, 2011 and Deecke, 2012.
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non-consciously, as the person does not ex-
plicitly decide to move his/her arm towards 
the lever, or explicitly decide to curl his/her 
fingers around the paper ballot in order to 
fold it. One could argue that the wider free 
action of voting is possible in part because 
a person does not have to be aware of and 
make conscious decisions about curling his/
her fingers (Raeff, 2017, pp. 17-18).
The fact that a person has unconsciously performed a 
series of motor act ions during the voting process, undoubt-
edly does not indicate that voting is not free; however, the 
behavior of “pulling the lever or folding the ballot before put-
ting it in the ballot box” should indeed be analyzed separately 
from the wider act of voting. It is my position that in Raeff ’s 
case, even if the act of voting for a particular person is inten-
tional, the subsidiary unconscious behaviors like reaching the 
lever are not. Note also that in Libet’s experiment, timing of 
the finger flexion is not a subsidiary act ion or choice, but is 
the decision to be consciously deliberated on. 
As it is stated above, I defend that there is no evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that there are unconscious inten-
tions; however, let’s for the sake of argument, assume that we 
have two kinds of intentions: unconscious ones and conscious 
ones. What charact eristics do conscious and unconscious in-
tentions have in common? As unconscious intentions are not 
observable introsp ectively, the only thing we can conclude they 
have in common is that they both result in an observable ac-
tion. Unlike conscious ones, unconscious intentions are not 
accompanied by a direct conscious deliberation. What is more, 
evolution (learning/unlearning) of unconscious intentions of 
a person is substantially different than that of conscious inten-
tions. Evolution of a person’s conscious intentions typically in-
volve a conscious evaluation of the outcomes of past decisions. 
After making some bad decisions on a subject, let’s say roman-
tic relationships, we hopefully give a break and think on our be-
havioral pattern thoroughly. And after building some opinions 
about the possible reason why we fail in relationships, we make 
a conscious decision to change our future conscious decisions 
to have better relationships. Or after making bad decisions in 
stock market, we reanalyze our past decisions to have better 
judgements in our later options. Evolution of so-called uncon-
scious intentions, on the other hand, is quite different: Neither 
Mele’s unconscious decision to unlock the door, nor artist’s 
making countless unconscious decisions(?) with his fingers (in 
Danto’s example) changes as a result of conscious analyses as 
straightforward as conscious decisions does. You need some ex-
perience on painting to build a skill/habit to paint properly and 
you cannot change your painting skills/habits simply by a con-
scious evaluation. The same is true for Mele’s habit to unlock 
his door. If Mele’s locking system is replaced by a key card sys-
tem, regardless of his conscious will, his so called unconscious 
intentional act ions may fail him for a while. If he does not start 
directing his awareness to the task of unlocking the door, he 
may find himself reaching his pocket as if he needs his old regu-
lar key, instead of using the key card in his wallet. In such a case, 
he would need some time and pract ice to develop new habits, 
in order to successfully unlock the new system. In adaptation 
period, neither Mele, nor the artist can suddenly change their 
habit by a conscious decision on the subject. What they need 
is pract ice. 
Consequently, these so called unconscious intentions, 
whatever they might be, are quite different in kind than con-
scious intentions as buying a new car (after considering the 
possible outcomes of the act ion) and their position in the 
philosophical discussion of freedom needs to be reevaluated. 
Furthermore, even if such unconscious purposeful behav-
iors are to be considered intentional for conceptual reasons, they 
are not free act ions, as it will be demonstrated in the following 
thought experiment: Let’s say that Megan’s father has had a heart 
attack and she is urgently driving to the hospital to see him. Nat-
urally, she is not consciously thinking about the condition of the 
road, when to shift gears, or the sp eed limit; but she is success-
fully coping with these details unconsciously. Now, are countless 
unconscious behaviors performed while driving freely chosen or 
intentional? Or are they just preprogrammed purposeful behav-
iors? In order to answer the question, let’s further assume that 
the hospital is very close to Meghan’s office, and that because she 
normally drives to her office on the same road used to get to the 
hospital, thinking about her father’s condition, she turns onto 
the wrong street and drives toward her office rather than the 
hospital, until she recognizes that she took the wrong turn. As 
a result, she wastes some time in an emergency situation. Now, 
in this instance did she choose to drive towards her office in-
stead of the hospital and if she did was it a free choice? In other 
words, did Megan choose to lose some time on the road towards 
her office and reach the hospital later than she could? Freedom 
and responsibility require being aware of the possible outcomes 
of performed act ions but unconscious behaviors do not satis-
fy this requirement. When Megan mistakenly turned towards 
her office instead of the hospital, she clearly was not aware of 
the consequences of her behaviors. At that moment, she was 
not even aware that she had any choices, but skillfully (in Drey-
fus’s sense), though mistakenly, drove towards her office under 
the direction of her unconscious neural act ivities. By not con-
sciously attending to the road, her “choices” were relinquished 
to her unconscious nervous system, which safely accomplishes 
the task of driving in the lack of contribution of conscious abil-
ities. There was no deliberation and she was not aware of the 
outcomes of her possible behaviors. Taking the wrong turn was 
not a choice and clearly not a free choice. Unconscious behaviors 
and so-called unconscious intentions are not caused by free will, 
since the agents are not aware of consequences of their uncon-
scious behaviors while they perform them .  Despite his endeavor 
to reconcile free will with Libet’s experiment, Gilberto Gomes 
also notes that only act ions that are decided and intended con-
sciously “should be considered as really free” (1999, p. 75).
On the other hand, Gomes (1999; 2007) suggests a 
promising conceptual analysis of free will to reconcile Libet’s 
experiment with freedom. He defends that even if certain un-
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):1-11, jan/apr 2021
Knowing Your Choice Before You Choose
9
conscious neural act ivities determine conscious self to make a 
choice, since these neural act ivities are parts of the workings of 
the self (or “I”), it can be said that it is the self (I) who makes the 
decision. In this view, even if it is/were true that RP determines 
an individual’s decisions, since RP is a part of the workings of 
the self, it can still be said that it is the self who makes the deci-
sion. Gomes’ analysis is promising to clarify certain conceptual 
problems about free will, however, I do not agree with his con-
clusion on the problem of free will, because I hold the view that 
unconscious brain act ivities should not be taken as parts of the 
self (I). In the case of Libet-style experiments, these neural pre-
cursors of conscious will are observed significantly earlier (in 
some experiments 7 to 10 seconds) than conscious will, which 
suggests that they are not parts of the conscious will. That is 
why, in my view, they are not likely to be parts of self either. 
Therefore, if the premise that self refers to brain act ivity corre-
sponding to only conscious processes is held (as I do), the exper-
imental findings of Libet and his successors pose a challenge to 
free will: if the self and its decisions are determined by neural 
act ivities which are not accompanied by consciousness, then 
the self is determined to do what it does, because of something 
external, namely unconscious neural precursors of it. 
Please note also that there is no reason to believe that in 
Libet’s experiment, participants’ intentions to flex their fin-
ger/wrist were unconscious. As it is stated above, the act ion 
of flexion at a desired time was not a subsidiary act ion but the
act ion to make a conscious decision about and unconscious 
neural act ivity did precede this particular act ion consciously 
chosen among from multiple alternatives. The participants 
reported that they consciously performed the act ion. This 
type of act ion is fundamentally different than Megan taking 
the wrong turn. Megan turning the wrong way was an un-
conscious automatic response to the circumstances she was 
in, while her attention was directed to condition of her father. 
In this section, dedicated to (so called) unconscious inten-
tions, four objections to Libet’s critics have been raised:  First, 
it is argued that unconscious intention can be defended to be 
a self-contradictory concept, on the premises that intention 
requires deliberation and deliberation requires awareness. Sec-
ond, it is claimed that whatever these unconscious intentions 
are, they are not observable or falsifiable. What is more, even 
if the existence of such unconscious intentions is accepted for 
conceptual reasons, they are not caused by free will and not rel-
evant to the problem of free will and responsibility. And finally, 
there is no reason to believe that in Libet’s experiment, the par-
ticipant’s choice of timing was unconsciously intended; actual-
ly, the participants reported that they consciously intended to 
flex their finger/wrist at a particular time.
Conclusion
Libet’s contribution to the study of free will continues to 
influence the philosophical debate on free will—and rightly 
so. One of the most prominent philosophical objections to 
Libet’s and follow up studies is that the act ions studied in the 
experiments involve little in the way of ethical and/or prag-
matic value.  In this paper, it is defended that all voluntary 
act ions involving a conscious consideration have ethical and/
or pragmatic value from the persp ective of the subject. Oth-
erwise, the subject would have no motivation to act or at least 
to deliberate. In the same vain, finger/wrist flexion, as used in 
Libet’s experimental model, has ethical and/or pragmatic val-
ue(s); therefore, there is no reason justifying that his findings 
cannot be applied to other voluntary act ions. In other words, 
the difference in degree of the ethical and/or pragmatic value 
between any two act ions does not constitute a qualitative dif-
ference making them different in kinds. 
Nonetheless, additional research based on act ions with a 
greater degree of ethical and/or pragmatic value than simple 
finger/wrist flexion would undoubtedly contribute to the de-
bate on free will. The experiment described in the section 3, 
which is based on a prisoner dilemma scenario, is an example 
of how to use an act ion as simple as finger/wrist flexion, but 
with an obviously higher degree of ethical and/or pragmatic 
value, to study free will in a laboratory setting.  
The thesis that unconscious intentions precede both 
conscious will and RP is appealing to some philosophers.  If 
they are right, unconscious intentions or neural act ivities un-
derlying it could be the driving force for the act ions studied in 
the Libet’s and his successors’ experiments; however, it is ar-
gued in this paper that the concept of “unconscious intention” 
is self-contradictory and existence of such intentions is not 
experimentally grounded. Moreover, act ions resulting from 
so called unconscious intentions fail to satisfy certain criteria 
for freedom of the will: Since they are unconscious by defini-
tion, subjects are not aware of their consequences and do not 
possess any control over them. Both being aware of the con-
sequences of choices and having control over the choices (and 
resulting act ion) seem to be necessary conditions of freedom. 
The ability to consciously veto an act ion, which Libet 
concedes to exist, in consideration of its ad hoc nature, does 
not help free will either. After RP is produced and conscious 
intention has arisen, individuals can decide not to perform 
the act ion; however, this does not exclude the possibility that 
such vetoing is neurologically predetermined, as was the ini-
tial will to perform the act ion.  There is an experimental study 
suggesting that decisions whether or not to veto an act ion also 
have neural precursors (Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2013). 
Libet’s and his followers’ findings are strong evidences that 
support physicalism and anti-libertarianism. As there is a phys-
ical state consistently preceding conscious will, I agree with the 
abduction that there is a physical cause for the conscious will 
and neural events underlying it. Libet’s experimental findings 
have implications beyond the metaphysical assumption that 
every event, including mental events, are caused by physical. 
When we choose an act ion to perform, we intuitively believe 
that from among the alternative possible act ions, the act ion we 
do perform is (at least partly) determined at that very moment 
it is consciously chosen. Libet’s experiment and subsequent 
studies decrease the credibility of this very intuitive assump-
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tion, which is of particular importance to libertarian (meta-
physically) philosophers. Time gap between the precursors of 
conscious will and conscious will itself makes it harder to con-
struct a libertarian concept of freedom, which would reconcile 
with the Libet-style experiments. 
Perhaps, the conscious will is not as important for deter-
mining what act ions we perform as is commonly thought, but 
is no more than a neurologically predetermined (in a broad 
sense), mediating cause of the act ions we think we choose to do. 
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